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Book Reviews
GREAT COURT-MARTIAL

CASES. By Joseph DiMona.t New

York: Grosset & Dunlap Publishers, 1972. Pp. xi, 291.
$6.95.
Great Court-MartialCases is a fascinating account of 12 military trials
which changed the course of military justice and in some instances of
the nation itself. The carefully selected cases start with the trial of
Major General Benedict Arnold in 1779 and end with that of Lieutenant William L. Calley, Jr. in 1971. Until the Freedom of Information
Act of 1967,' the transcripts of these cases were not available to the
general public so the book presents for the first time accounts based on
the records of the trials of such notables as General George Custer,
General William (Billy) Mitchell, and Sergeant Matthew C. McKeon.
The discussion of each case is preceded by a prologue to place it in
the context of its time, and followed by an epilogue to place it in
the context of history and jurisprudence. This unusual format gives
the book continuity and points out certain similarities in trials which
span a period of almost two hundred years.
Students of history will be interested in learning some of the heretofore unreported details of the trial which may have caused Benedict
Arnold to become a traitor.
In 1807 the United States Naval ship, the Chesapeake, was attacked
by a British warship. When Commodore James Barron surrendered the
ship because the Chesapeake's guns could not be made operable in time
to fight back, he was tried by a United States Naval court-martial, convicted, and suspended from the Navy for five years. In 1968 Captain
Lloyd Bucher found his ship, the Pueblo, in almost identical circumstances. The Pueblo, which was not itself a warship and had only two
machine guns aboard, was surrounded by armed North Korean warships. Although Captain Bucher surrendered and the ship and the men
were taken prisoner, the United States Navy did not even reprimand
Bucher for doing so. Mr. DiMona points out how the change in public
sentiment from 1807 to 1968 toward "giving up the ship to the enemy"
was the real reason for the difference in the outcome of these cases.
t Former reporter for the Washington Post and writer of television news and documentaries.
1. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1970).
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Few people realize that the legendary hero of the Little Big Horn,
General George Custer, was convicted of what amounted to an ordinary
AWOL and was suspended from his rank of Major General for a year.
In 1956 Sergeant Matthew C. McKeon took his marine recruits on a
night march into the swamps of Parris Island. When some men were
drowned and others injured public indignation over the incident became so great that the Marine Corps made public statements condemning Sergeant McKeon's training procedures. His court-martial established that those procedures were very typical of established marine
training at the time.
In 1967 Captain Howard Levy, a dermatologist, was tried for refusing
to teach medical procedures to Green Berets because he considered them
combat troops rather than medics. Until that trial, the question of
whether there was any freedom of speech in the military was largely
unresolved. Although it is still not entirely resolved, Mr. DiMona
points out that in the aftermath of that trial more was done to define
the parameters of that right in the military context than ever before.
Without question the most controversial court-martial in American
history was that of Lieutenant William Calley. Mr. DiMona's coverage
of the case and its aftermath are interesting and pertinent.
The basic theme running through the book is that military justice
is subject to one outstanding flaw, which is command influence. Command influence is the evil unique to military justice whereby the
results of judicial proceedings are improperly influenced by a person
or persons superior in military rank to the judge or jury or both. The
problem of command influence arises from the dilemma created by the
need, on the one hand, for the military to use its judicial machinery to
assist in maintaining strict discipline and by the objective, on the other
hand, of providing a system which insures justice and protects the rights
of persons subject to the system. While command influence has been
a problem in the administration of military justice during some periods
of time and in some commands, it was identified years ago by the
military itself and by the Court of Military Appeals as something that
had to be eliminated from the system and numerous steps were taken
to do so. The Military Justice Act of 19692 (UCMJ) topped off these
efforts by establishing a military judiciary which is almost entirely
independent from the rest of the military. Since then most defense
counsel in military cases have considered it a dead issue and have not
even bothered to raise it.
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Mr. DiMona concludes his book by saying:
But the aftermath of the [Calley] trial showed that the system is
still not perfect, still does not work, and perhaps can never function
consistently until the factor of command influence is eliminated.8
Mr. DiMona's preoccupation with command influence permeates
his book to the extent that the reader is left with the impression that
it is still a major problem and that until it is solved there can be no
justice in courts-martial. In actuality, under the present system the
possibility of command influence has been practically eliminated. Since
it has not been completely eliminated, Congress should amend the
UCMJ to provide for an independent judicial system in the military
somewhat along the lines suggested by Senator Birch Bayh in a recent
proposal. 4 Such a change would eliminate the appearance as well as
any remaining possibility of command influence. But by indicating that
there is no justice in courts-martial, DiMona himself does a grave injustice to a system which has in many respects been far ahead of the
federal and state criminal justice systems in safeguarding the constitutional rights of defendants and in other respects. To name a few
examples, the military provided defense counsel and paid the expenses
of conducting the defense whether or not the defendant was indigent
long before the United States Supreme Court concluded in Gideon v.
Wainwright5 that indigent persons accused of serious crimes were entitled to have defense counsel appointed and paid for by the sovereign.
Likewise, the court-martial system required that a defendant be warned
of his rights before being interrogated by the police before Miranda v.
Arizona6 extended the same protection to civilian defendants.
Great Court-MartialCases presents perhaps for the first time accounts
based on the trial transcripts of some of the most significant courtsmartial in the history of the United States in interesting and very
readable form. It will make enjoyable reading for any student of
history, of the military, or of criminal justice even if the author's
preoccupation with one issue tends to undermine the accuracy of some
of his conclusions.
Michael W. Balfe*
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

10 U.S.C. §§ 801-940 (1970).

J.

DIMONA, GREAT COURT-MARTIAL

CASES 286 (1972).

116 CONG. REC. 22404 (1970).
372 U.S. 335 (1963).
384 U.S. 436 (1966).
* LL.B., University of Pittsburgh, 1966; LL.M., Georgetown University Law Center,
1970; Judge Advocate General's Corps, 1967-1970; Chief of Military Justice, Headquarters
First United States Army, 1969-1970; Member of Pennsylvania Bar.
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By Hanna Fenichel
Pitkin.t Berkeley: University of Califorina Press, 1'972.
Pp. 323. $3.65.
THE CONCEPT OF REPRESENTATION.

Hanna Pitkin's widely acclaimed, The Concept of Representation,

which was first published in 1967, has been recently reissued in a
paperback edition. Upon its initial publication, the book attracted
scholarly notice as a thorough historical and analytical treatment of
the idea of representation, and as an excellent example of the strengths
and weaknesses of ordinary language philosophy. Perhaps after the
passage of five years, marked by the appearance of deep political conflicts, militant radical movements espousing notions of representation
at variance with liberal orthodoxy, and a return to ambitious speculative political philosophy, Pitkin's work requires reconsideration from
the viewpoint of the present public situation.
For the reader who has followed ideological transformations in the
United States over the past five years, the most striking characteristic
of Pitkin's work will be its faithful reflection of the consensus liberalism
of the early 1960's and its adherence to the assumptions of structuralfunctional social science. Despite the author's claim that she is illuminating "the single, basic meaning of representation,", her discussion
has a distinct ideological bias. According to Pitkin, the historical
problem underlying contemporary confusions about the meaning of
representation is the decline of widespread belief that political questions have correct answers which can be found. While for Edmund
Burke there were objective and identifiable interests which a representative had an obligation to promote, in the contemporary era "political
questions are inevitably controversial ones without a right answer,
interests are the interests of someone who has a right to help define
them, and no reliable elite group exists in society."' 2 Pitkin's analysis
of the concept of representation can be understood as an attempt to
revive the notion that representatives should promote the objective
welfare of their constituents, and to make this notion acceptable to
the contemporary mind. She implies that in the absence of such a
concept, representation becomes a matter of satisfying subjective preferences, which may in turn be manipulated by appeals to irrational
motivations.
t
1.
2.

Professor of Political Science, University of California (Berkeley).
H. PrrKlN, TiE CONCEPT OF REPRESENATION 10 (1972) [hereinafter cited as PITEIN].
PITKIN 189.
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Pitkin fails in her enterprise, because she does not provide content
to the concept of public interest. She states only that when a representative acts in a manner contrary to the wishes of his constituents, he
is obligated to explain his conduct to them. She does not state what
would constitute a good reason for deviating from constituent preference, except the claim that the constituent would agree with the
representative if he only had more information. This kind of claim
would not seem to take care of differences between representatives and
constituents about desirable ends, but would only apply to debates
about appropriate means. Despite these problems, however, Pitkin is
prepared to defend current representative governments. Recognizing
widespread constituent apathy, misinformation, and value conflicts
she argues:
Political representation is primarily a public, institutionalized
arrangement involving many people and groups, and operating
in the complex ways of large-scale social arrangements. What makes
it representation is not any single action by any one participant,
but the over-all structure and functioning of the system, the patterns emerging from the multiple activities of many people.3
This argument transfers responsibility for the public interest from
particular individuals to the anonymous functioning of a social system.
It leads Pitkin to conclude that "[e]ven if most people vote in an
irrational and uninformed response to primary group pressures, this
does not preclude the system as a whole from displaying a degree of
'rational' response." 4 Where human beings are incapable of defining
the substance of the public interest, they may always hope that the
"system as a whole" will do it for them. The consequences of such a
position are profoundly conservative. There are no standards for
evaluating how well the system functions and, even more important,
no incentives for expanding intelligent political participation. With
regard to public policy, the constituent "need not express his wishes, or
even have formulated any, but he must be capable of doing so; when
he does, his wishes should be fulfilled unless there is good reason (in
terms of his interest) to the contrary." 5 In consequence, those who are
most articulate and who have been able to formulate their desires with
the greatest clarity will have their way more frequently than the less
3.

Id. at 221-22.

4., Id. at 224..
5. Id. at 232.
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articulate and more confused. This is a prescription for elitism, and
stems from Pitkin's failure to take account of the educational, economic,
and cultural requirements for responsible representation.
The roots of Pitkin's failure are in her interpretation of the differences between the present era and Burke's age. Perhaps the most
significant change since Burke's time is not the absence of belief in a
natural law interpreted by a "reliable elite group," but the inability of
elite groups to sustain the belief of broad masses that the various interests in contemporary societies are additive. In her discussion of Burke,
Pitkin notes that "in his fundamental thought" interests are not only
objective, but additive: "The interests of the realm, added together,
compose the interest of the realm. All the different localities and functional groupings in the nation are part of the nation, and consequently
have an interest in the welfare of the whole."7 Though Pitkin does not
follow it up, the inability to maintain that interests are additive in the
modem age points to an alternative theory of history to the one she
develops. The revolutionary movements of the eighteenth, nineteenth,
and twentieth centuries have been based upon the principle that some
of the most important social interests (for example, economic class,
ethnic and racial, religious ties) may be or actually are in fundamental
conflict. The modern period has been characterized by the appearance
of competing worldviews issuing in conflicting political programs and
activities. Under these conditions it is no cause for surprise that many
human beings have found it difficult to believe that elite groups are
able to discern the public interest and put measures into effect to
secure it. Their doubts have rested on the more basic doubt that interests are additive. Pitkin's appeal to a public interest does nothing to
meet these suspicions, which themselves grow out of and refer back to
severe and actual political conflicts.
One consequence of Pitkin's approach is a concern with the characteristics of the representative (what should the representative do?)
rather than with the aspirations of the constituent and their quality
(who should the constituent support?). For Pitkin, the core meaning
of representation is acting in the interest of the represented, in a
manner responsive to them, but also independently and with discretion
(though the represented are conceived as capable of independent action
and judgment). The concept of representation covers an area of cases
6. Id. at 186.
7. Id.
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between the point at which the representative becomes a mere mouthpiece for constituents and the point at which he becomes their guardian.
By concentrating on the tension between the poles of mouthpiece
and guardian, Pitkin obscures a more fundamental predicament. If
the problem of representation is merely furthering the interests of the
constituents consistent with the promotion of the public interest, then
Pitkin's conceptualization of representation seems adequate. However,
regardless of traditions of language use, if people are separated by
clashing worldviews and are engaged in severe political conflicts, other
concepts of representation may be more adequate to clarifying and
transforming the public situation. What, for example, might be the
perspective on representation held by someone concerned with securing
major institutional changes or by someone concerned with defending
institutions against attack?
For those engaged in comprehensive and deep conflicts, the best
representative is one who can be trusted, who shares one's worldview
and general aspirations. The point is neither to find a representative
who will be a puppet, nor to select one who will act as a guardian, nor
even to choose one who will be some of both, but, instead, to select a
representative who will act as a friend or colleague. Conceived of in
this way, the representative is not a passive tool, but someone who meets
issues as they arise from the viewpoint of a set of principles which are
shared by the constituent. He applies those principles in specific decisions, and thereby gains a certain discretion. However, this discretion
does not arise from an ability to know the public interest any better
than the constituent, but from performing a specific function (promoting public policies in a given institutional structure) which the constituent does not perform. Under this interpretation, the constituent
should be able to recognize his own will in the representative's decision,
even if he had not thought about the issue beforehand. If such recognition does not occur, then the constituent has not been represented in
that case. Thus, there can be no, representation in this sense when
political judgments are irrational and uninformed responses to primary
group pressures, because there is no "objective welfare" assumed which
can be promoted apart from reference to a particular shared worldview.
Pitkin recognizes that a theorist's view of representation is "correlated
with his conception of political life in the broadest sense: his ideas on
the nature of political issues, the relative capacities of rulers and
ruled, the nature of man and society-in short what we might call his
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metapolitics." s However, she does not carry this insight over to the
relations between representative and constituent. Do they not also have
metapolitics? She argues that "to the degree that interests, will, welfare,
or whatever is supposed to be involved in representing as activity is
regarded as something each man can only define for himself, representing as activity becomes impossible."9 Now, the commitment to a
metapolitics or a worldview can only be defined by each man for
himself, but this does not mean that each individual has a unique
worldview. A representative relation can be constituted between two
people with similar worldviews and political preferences, only this
relation will look more like friendship than like something between
servility and guardianship. In a constituency with deep ideological
divisions, a representative will not be able to represent the constituency
as a whole, but only those constituents who share his proclivities. This
is because there is no public interest beyond the conception of public
interest defined in each worldview. The representative may attempt to
explain how his decisions are consistent with the goals of a particular
program, but he may not claim that he is representing when he acts
to attain aims at variance with those of his constituents. At bottom,
Pitkin assumes that for representation to occur there must be a broad
consensus on ultimate values and metapolitical conceptions. However,
the foregoing analysis has revealed that this is only one special case of
representation, where all parties to the relation can pretend that an
objective public interest is being served. Perhaps the assumption of
political consensus is built into the ordinary usage of the term representation in the English language. If so, then ordinary usage in this
case stands in the way of clarifying the public situation, for beyond the
special case of representation where political consensus exists, there
are the many cases of representation in situations of intense ideological
conflict. In these cases a more basic concept of representation is revealed
-that of trust and civic friendship among those with the same political
direction. Thus, one might say that Pitkin presents a "special theory
of representation" applicable to some phases of British and American
history, which is only one case of a much broader "general theory of
representation."
Perhaps the foregoing discussion seems unsatisfactory because there
is no assurance given that conflicts ultimately have a rational solution.
8. Id. at 146.
9. Id. at 208.
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When faced with the possibility of deep antagonisms, Pitkin merely
gives up. She states that where there is
... lifelong, profound disagreement among men as to what their
interest is-disagreement that remains despite deliberation and
justification and argument . . . the possibility of a substantive
acting for others breaks down, and that view of the concept [of
representation] becomes irrelevant to politics. 10

This passage reveals the assumption Pitkin makes that consensus is a
prerequisite for representation, but even more important, it betrays a
profound pessimism about the possibilities for transcending ideological
conflicts. "Deliberation," "justification," and "argument" are all words
related to the view that political discourse is aimed at arriving at some
"correct" or "true" resolution of outstanding problems. Where people
hold conflicting definitions of truth itself, this view of discourse will
not lead to conflict resolution but, perhaps, even to the exacerbation of
conflicts. An alternative to the "deliberation" model of discourse, which
takes account of ideological conflict, is the view that the best possibility
for conflict resolution lies in the growing appreciation of diverse worldviews by the general public. Such appreciation of different perspectives
would not necessarily lead to consensus, but it would, perhaps, alleviate
some of the worst barbarities. However, if appreciation rather than
deliberation is the best hope for overcoming some of the worst conflicts
of the modem age, then it is not sufficient to take a functionalist view
of representation in which citizens may be irrational reactors and the
system may continue to function well. It is necessary to create a citizenry
capable of relativizing perspectives and appreciating diversity, and at
this point in history, such creative activity would not be representative
of many people.
Michael A. Weinstein*
10. Id. at 213.
* Ph.D., Case Western Reserve University, 1967; Professor of Political Science, Purdue
University.
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THE NEW URBAN POLITICS:

CITIES AND THE FEDERAL

Edited by Douglas M. Fox.t Pacific Palisades: Goodyear Publishing Company, Inc., 1972. Pp. xiv,
303. $4.95.
GOVERNMENT.

This book, a compilation of post-1965 articles on cities, the federal
government and the relationship between the two, has as its stated
purpose, "to introduce the reader to the study of relationships between
the American federal government and the cities."' The topic has been
a key one since the New Deal but has heightened importance since
President Nixon's recent efforts to drastically alter federal-state-city
relationships. American cities, large and small, have no chance of maintaining or increasing their livability without substantial financial
assistance from the federal government. The form, the delivery mechanisms, and the amount of these federal funds directly influence the
nature of federal and local politics.
As I read this book, cities, counties and states were receiving their
first revenue sharing checks from the federal government; these checks
are a down payment of $5.3 billion of unrestricted federal aid to state
and local governments this year.2 Simultaneously, other federal funds
were being cut off. Secretary George Romney of HUD announced a
funding moratorium on all federally subsidized housing construction.
Model Cities and Urban Renewal Agencies, it was announced, will also
be phased down. 8 Other important cutbacks included a freeze on
Economic Development Administration funds, a ten percent reduction
in federal aid to education, a cut back from $2 billion to $1.2 billion for
federally funded social service programs, and reductions in manpower
4
programs.
The effects of these drastic funding changes are only beginning to be
felt on the local political scene. Clearly, the Nixon Administration is
.using revenue sharing to effect some political changes at the local and
state level. According to the National Journal,
[i]n the view of the Nixon Administration and of others who have
pushed revenue sharing, the categorical grant system has established
a huge bureaucracy in Washington that operates in ways incomt Professor, University of Connecticut.
1. D. Fox, THE NEW URBAN POLmICS xi (1972) [hereinafter cited as Fox].
2. Team Report, 1970 NAT'L J. 1553 [hereinafter cited as NAT'L J.].
3. N.Y. Times, Jan. 9, 1973, at 1, col. 1.
4. Pittsburgh Press, Jan. 14, 1973, § B, at 1,'col. 1.
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patible with a true democracy. The bureaucracy, they believe, is
not answerable to the people whose lives it directly affects. 5
John Ehrlichman, assistant to the President for domestic affairs, has
been quoted as saying that revenue sharing's chief benefit is that it "returns the political spotlight to locally elected officials," and that it will
' 7
. . improve the quality of locally elected officials.
Elected officials, with a no-strings federal subsidy, are indeed forced
into a situation in which they have greater flexibility in responding to
their constituencies. In some cities this means lowering of taxes, in
others it means expenditures for needed capital equipment. In all, it
means some turmoil as the local decision making process adjusts to cope
with the local windfall.
Douglas Fox's book of readings, while not aimed directly at the
revenue sharing issue, provides some analysis of the history and effects
of earlier federal aid programs on local governments and serves as a
framework which can be used to analyze the new funding arrangements.
The book is organized into five major sections: The New Urban Environment, the Federal System and the Cities, the Federal Policy-Making Process, the Politics of Policy Implementation, and What Can the
Federal Government Do. Some of the selections are significant contributions to this emerging field of literature, and make the implications of
current federal-local changes more understandable.
In the first section, James Q. Wilson's The Mayors Versus the Cities
is reprinted from The Public Interest.8 Wilson observes that during
the late 1960's many big city mayors, once elected, tended toward more
liberal decisions and stances than would be expected given their voting
constituency. Wilson explains this behavior by examining the importance of the mayor's audience, rather than constituency. Wilson maintains that because federal, state, and private funds must be obtained by
a mayor to improve his city, he must respond to the more liberal
federal bureaucrats and progressive businessmen who control these
discretionary dollars. This is certainly an interesting and plausible
outcome when federal technicians make the key decisions on the allocation of federal dollars.
The effect of the formula-based revenue sharing on this behavior is
5. NAT'L J. at 1555.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 1557.
8. Wilson, The Mayors Versus the Cities, 16 Public Interest 25 (1969).
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not difficult to project. Since mayors will find it less necessary to
influence federal bureaucrats to receive funds, the role of the audience
will diminish. Ehrlichman's desire for increased responsiveness by
politicians to their constituencies will occur. The effect on how dollars
will be spent and how this will affect a city's ability to tackle its problems, particularly those of minority groups, is difficult to determine. In
Wilson's opinion ". . . the audience has played a critical role in preventing . . . the emergence of an urban nativism that would exploit

base emotions and encourage vindictive sentiments." 9 It will be important to examine the effect of revenue sharing in these terms.
Two articles on the Federal Policy Making Process are particularly
noteworthy. Harold Shulman provides a fascinating description of the
politics behind presidential commissions in Behind the Scenes and
Under the Rug: One Man's PresidentialCommission. Shulman's article
takes the generality that bureaucrats are turf-protectors, and puts it into
a case study with the bureaucrats identified. Lee Rainwater and William
Yancy analyze the politics surrounding the publication of the Moynihan
Report, formally titled The Negro Family, A Case Study for National
Action. The issuance of the Moynihan Report in 1965 created significant
upset in the black community, academia, and the federal government.
This selection emphasizes the manner in which the permanent government (civil service bureaucrats) handles unpleasant policy shifts which
are caused by the presidential government (political appointments).
The section on the Politics of Policy Implementation is limited to an
analysis of the implementation of the Federal Anti-Poverty and Model
Cities Programs. The selections, however, only provide varying explanations of the failures of these programs. One exception, by Frances
Fox Piven and Richard Cloward on How the Federal Government
Caused the Welfare Crisis, provides evidence that the welfare rolls grew
in the 1960's directly as a result of the social action programs, since
these programs brought a larger number of eligibles into the welfare
program. This outcome was dramatic but completely unplanned by
those who framed the social action programs. It is the kind of unplanned
outcome which can accompany a change as far-reaching as revenue
sharing.
Although this book certainly has a number of pluses, it also has some
major problems. First, the book does not adequately fulfill its stated
purpose of introducing the reader to the topic. The editor's comments
9.

Fox 25.

459

Duquesne Law Review
are too sparse to permit the development of a theme or generalization
about urban politics and the federal government. Second, like many
readers, it is an uneven collection of articles, some very elementary,
others quite advanced. This volume will be of most interest to someone
who has pursued, or intends to pursue, the study of federal-local politics
in depth.
Paul C. Brophy*
SA.B., LaSalle College, 1967; M.C.P., University of Pennsylvania, 1969; Program Man.
ager, ACTION-Housing, Inc., Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.
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